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Two	years	after	the	vote,	there	is	little	certainty	regarding	the	UK’s	political	and	economic	future.
Brexiters	themselves	are	split	between	wanting	a	Singapore-on-Thames	or	a	Belarus-on-Trent.	Simon
Hix	(LSE)	assesses	where	the	UK-EU	relationship	is	heading.	He	argues	that	despite	persisting
uncertainty,	a	No	Deal	is	the	least-preferred	option	of	both	the	UK	or	the	EU27,	and	hence	the	least
likely.	He	suggests	that	some	sort	of	agreement	will	be	reached	before	March	2019.
While	there	has	been	much	debate	about	the	Brexit	“withdrawal	agreement”	and	the	transition
arrangements	there	has	been	less	discussion	of	the	longer-term	“future	relationship”	between	the	UK
and	the	EU27.		The	choice	between	a	“Hard”	or	“Soft”	Brexit	has	been	known	for	some	time,	but	the	options	are
better	characterised	as	a	continuum	rather	than	a	dichotomy.
No	Deal	–	leaving	the	EU	without	a	deal,	and	trading	as	a	World	Trade	Organization	member.	
Basic	FTA	–	EU-UK	free	trade	agreement	(FTA)	similar	to	the	EU	agreements	with	Canada,	South	Korea
and	Japan,	which	mainly	cover	trade	in	goods	but	contain	very	little	on	services.
FTA+	–	an	FTA	which	includes	an	agreement	on	financial	services,	such	as	“mutual	recognition”	of
regulatory	standards,	a	“regulatory	equivalence”	agreement,	or	the	UK	applying	EU	regulations	and	EU
Court	jurisdiction	in	return	for	access.
EEA-		–	the	UK	remains	in	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	but	secures	some	opt-outs,	in	particular
on	the	free	movement	of	people	(such	as	a	cap	on	the	number	of	EU	migrants	registering	to	work	each
month	or	an	“emergency	brake”).
EEA	–	the	UK	remains	in	the	EEA,	so	stays	in	the	single	market	(the	free	movement	of	goods,	services,
capital	and	persons,	EU	rules,	and	EU	Court	jurisdiction)	and	pays	into	the	EU	budget,	but	leaves	the
customs	union	(to	sign	FTAs	with	third	countries)	and	gains	control	of	fisheries	and	agriculture.
The	key	question,	then,	is	which	of	these	options	do	the	UK	and	the	EU27	prefer	independently	and	jointly?		To
answer	this,	let’s	consider	the	economic	and	political	interests	of	the	two	sides.
Starting	with	economics,	the	“harder”	the	Brexit,	the	bigger	the	likely	economic	impact	to	both	the	UK	and	EU27,	as	a
result	of	the	loss	of	trade	due	to	new	physical,	fiscal	or	regulatory	barriers.		The	UK	would	save	in	terms	of	its
payments	to	the	EU	and	could	claim	back	some	of	the	losses	in	EU	trade	with	new	trade	agreements	with	third
countries.	But,	standard	trade	“gravity”	models	suggest	that	agreements	with	countries	that	are	further	away	are
unlikely	to	compensate	for	any	loss	of	trade	with	the	EU.	As	a	result,	in	the	UK	government’s	leaked	cross-Whitehall
report,	HM	Treasury	estimated	that	a	No	Deal	outcome	would	reduce	UK	GDP	by	8%	over	15	years	(relative	to
current	trend	growth),	a	free	trade	agreement	along	the	lines	of	the	EU-Canada	agreement	would	reduce	GDP	by
5%	over	the	same	period,	and	the	EEA	option	would	lower	GDP	by	2%.
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The	EU	is	unlikely	to	be	hit	as	hard	as	the	UK.		In	2016,	the	EU27	constituted	43%	of	UK	exports	in	goods	and
services,	while	the	UK	constituted	only	16%	of	EU	exports	in	goods	and	services,	and	total	UK	trade	with	the	EU27
(exports	plus	imports)	constituted	12%	of	UK	GDP	while	total	EU27	trade	to	the	UK	constituted	only	3-4%	of	EU27
GDP.		As	a	result,	analysis	from	the	EU’s	side	suggests	that	an	EEA	outcome	would	only	cost	the	EU27
approximately	0.1%	of	GDP	by	2030,	a	basic	FTA	would	mean	a	loss	of	0.3-0.6%	of	GDP,	and	a	No	Deal	outcome
would	cost	0.3-0.8%	of	GDP.
The	content	of	the	trade	between	the	UK	and	EU27	is	also	asymmetric,	as	the	following	figure	shows.	In	2016	there
was	an	overall	trade	deficit	between	the	UK	and	the	EU27	of	£80	billion.	Also,	whereas	there	was	a	large	UK	to
EU27	trade	deficit	in	goods	(of	£96	billion)	there	was	a	trade	surplus	in	services	(of	£14	billion).
This	trade	asymmetry	has	strategic	implications	for	the	negotiations.	Both	sides	have	an	interest	in	securing	a	trade
agreement,	and	any	reduction	in	imports	or	exports	will	have	negative	implications	for	consumers	and	businesses	in
the	UK	and	EU27.	Nevertheless,	at	the	aggregate	level,	which	is	what	politicians	tend	to	focus	on,	the	sectoral
balance	of	trade	suggests	that	the	EU27	are	more	eager	to	want	a	deal	that	secures	as	frictionless	trade	as	possible
for	goods	yet	will	be	less	eager	than	the	UK	for	a	deal	that	includes	free	trade	in	services.
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The	negotiations	will	also	be	shaped	by	politics,	of	course.	As	many	commentators	have	noted,	the	referendum
outcome	on	23	June	2016	was	driven	more	by	cultural	and	ideological	values	than	by	economic	interests.	The
“project	fear”	message	of	the	Remain	campaign,	which	emphasised	the	economic	costs	of	Brexit,	was	trumped	by
the	“take	back	control”	message	of	the	official	Leave	campaign	and	the	explicitly	nationalist	message	of	the	unofficial
Leave.EU	campaign.
Mirroring	the	two	Leave	campaigns,	there	are	now	two	competing	narratives	about	a	post-Brexit	Britain.	The	so-
called	“liberal	leavers”	present	“Singapore-on-Thames”	vision:	regaining	sovereignty	to	deregulate	the	economy,
abolishing	“Brussels	red	tape”,	pursuing	a	liberal	immigration	policy,	signing	free	trade	agreements	with	partners
across	the	world,	and	even	unilaterally	cutting	tariffs	and	quotas	on	imports.	This	narrative	is	often	associated	with
libertarian	think-tanks	like	the	Adam	Smith	Institute,	Economists	for	Free	Trade,	Legatum	Institute,	Institute	of
Economic	Affairs,	and	Initiative	for	Free	Trade.
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The	problem	for	these	“liberal	leavers”	is	that	most	Leave	voters	actually	prefer	a	“Belarus-on-Trent”	vision	of
Britain:	more	socially	conservative	and	more	economically	protectionist.	For	example,	the	above	figure	shows	the
relationship	between	liberal	social	and	economic	values	and	the	probability	of	someone	voting	to	Leave	the	EU.	
Every	“socially	liberal”	value	in	the	survey	is	negatively	correlated	with	voting	to	Leave	the	EU,	and	Leave	voters	do
not	have	clearly	“liberal”	economic	values.		Indeed,	following	their	own	survey	of	public	attitudes,	the	Legatum
Institute	reluctantly	conceded	that	the	British	public	post-Brexit	generally	supports	higher	taxes,	more	public
spending,	nationalisation	of	key	industries,	and	more	regulation	of	markets	and	labour	markets	in	particular.
The	EU27	also	have	some	key	political	interests.	In	particular,	the	EU27	does	not	want	to	undermine	the	integrity	of
the	four	freedoms	(of	goods,	services,	capital,	and	persons)	in	the	single	market.		One	aspect	of	this	“no	cherry-
picking”	line	relates	to	the	current	agreements	the	EU	has	with	third	countries.	Any	special	arrangement	for	the	UK,
for	example	for	financial	services	access,	would	lead	Switzerland,	South	Korea,	Canada,	and	others	to	demand
similar	arrangements,	under	the	WTO	Most-Favoured-Nation	rules.
A	second	aspect	relates	to	the	potential	unravelling	of	the	EU	itself,	driven	by	a	fear	of	Brexit	contagion.		Support	for
anti-EU	populist	parties	has	grown	in	a	large	number	of	member	states	since	the	mid-2000s.	Regardless	of	how
painful	the	process	of	Brexit	will	be	for	the	UK,	once	the	UK	is	out	the	other	side,	there	will	be	a	new	exit	model:	a
“British	model”.	This	model	might	be	attractive	to	several	countries	who,	like	the	UK,	are	not	members	of	the	Euro	nor
support	deeper	political	integration,	especially	if	the	new	“British	model”	means	considerable	access	to	the	EU	single
market,	a	special	customs	relationship,	and	some	control	on	the	free	movement	of	people.
This	discussion	suggests	the	following	rank-ordering	of	the	options	by	the	UK	and	EU27:
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From	the	UK’s	side,	on	the	assumption	that	political	interests	–	and	particularly	the	“red-lines”	on	sovereignty	and
ending	the	free	movement	of	people	–	over-ride	economic	interests,	the	FTA+	and	FTA	options	outweigh	the	EEA-
and	EEA	options.		Meanwhile,	from	the	EU27’s	side,	the	two	most	preferred	outcomes,	in	terms	of	maintaining	the
integrity	of	the	single	market,	are	the	EEA	and	a	Basic	FTA,	whereas	the	EU	is	largely	indifferent	between	the	FTA+
and	EEA-	options,	as	either	would	involve	a	potentially	dangerous	precedent.	Encouragingly,	though,	No	Deal	is	the
least-preferred	option	of	both	the	UK	or	the	EU27,	which	suggests	that	some	sort	of	agreement	will	be	reached.
These	preference-orderings	produce	the	following	bargaining	situation:
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There	is	only	one	equilibrium	in	this	game:	a	Basic	FTA.	The	EU27	would	play	“hardball”	because	they	prefer	an
EEA	or	a	Basic	FTA	to	any	other	outcome.	The	UK’s	“best	response”	to	this	strategy	would	be	to	also	play	hardball,
as	they	prefer	a	Basic	FTA	to	the	EEA.	Furthermore,	neither	the	EU27	nor	the	UK	have	an	incentive	to	deviate	from
this	equilibrium;	so	neither	side	has	an	incentive	to	“compromise”.
This	does	not	mean	that	other	outcomes	are	not	possible.	In	fact,	this	analysis	helps	us	focus	on	what	would	have	to
change	for	a	different	outcome	to	emerge.	For	example,	for	an	FTA+	rather	than	a	Basic	FTA	(as	indicated	by	the
orange	arrow),	the	EU27	would	need	to	compromise,	to	allow	UK	“cherry-picking”.	Alternatively,	for	the	final
outcome	to	be	the	EEA	rather	than	a	Basic	FTA	(as	indicated	by	the	blue	arrow),	UK	domestic	politics	would	have	to
shift,	so	that	the	“red	lines”	on	ECJ	jurisdiction,	adhering	to	EU	regulatory	rules,	and	the	continued	free	movement	of
people	are	removed.	This	is	unlikely	given	the	preferences	of	Theresa	May,	the	composition	of	the	UK	Cabinet,	or
the	views	of	the	majority	in	the	House	of	Commons.	Nevertheless,	these	preferences	could	change,	for	example,	if
public	attitudes	on	the	free	movement	of	people	change,	or	if	there	is	a	sudden	and	significant	economic	shock	that
shifts	Conservative	MPs’	views	about	staying	in	the	single	market.
Then,	for	an	EEA-	rather	than	a	basic	FTA	(as	shown	by	the	green	arrow),	the	EU	would	need	to	allow	UK	“cherry-
picking”	and	UK	domestic	politics	would	need	to	shift	to	remove	the	key	red	lines.
Finally,	even	if	the	preferences	of	the	UK	or	the	EU27	change,	a	further	limitation	is	the	ratification	hurdle	for	the	final
agreement:	unanimity	in	the	Council	and	ratification	in	more	than	30	national	and	regional	parliaments.	Every	“veto
player”	would	need	to	prefer	the	same	alternative	to	a	Basic	FTA	for	a	different	deal	to	emerge.	And,	there	will	be	not
much	time	to	agree	and	ratifying	an	agreement:	between	March	2019	and	the	end	of	the	transition	period	at	the	end
of	December	2020.
I	have	tried	to	focus	on	is	how	political	bargaining	over	the	final	Brexit	deal	might	play	out,	based	on	underlying
economic	and	political	interests.	This	analysis	suggests	we	are	heading	for	a	basic	free	trade	agreement,	which
includes	zero	tariffs	and	quotas	on	goods	and	some	special	customs	arrangements,	but	with	not	much	on	services
trade.
It	will	be	difficult	to	agree	the	“plus”	part	of	a	free	trade	agreement	on	financial	services.		The	EU27	would	suffer	an
economic	hit	if	there	are	limitations	on	the	access	of	financial	service	providers	in	the	City	of	London	to	the	single
market.	However,	the	economic	impact	for	the	EU27	would	be	much	smaller	than	for	the	UK.	In	the	medium-term,
large	parts	of	the	UK	financial	services	industry	could	move	to	Frankfurt,	Paris,	Dublin,	Amsterdam	and	Luxembourg.
And,	the	political	cost	for	the	EU27	of	compromising	in	this	area	could	damage	the	integrity	of	the	internal	regulatory
and	mutual	recognition	frameworks	of	the	single	market,	which	the	EU	seems	determined	to	avoid.
On	top	of	all	that,	the	negotiating	time	will	be	short	and	the	ratification	hurdles	will	be	high.	Put	another	way,	now	is
not	the	time	to	propose	to	the	Wallonia	parliament	or	the	French	National	Assembly	a	trade	agreement	that	gives
City	of	London	bankers	easy	access	to	the	single	market,	without	the	UK	applying	EU	rules	or	being	subject	to	ECJ
jurisdiction.
This	is	a	summary	of	the	Annual	Lecture	of	the	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies.	The	full	text	of	the	lecture	is
available	online.	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.
Simon	Hix	is	the	Harold	Laski	Professor	of	Political	Science	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political
Science.
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